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I. THE VIDEO TAPE PORTRAYING THE PORTION OF THE ROAD PRECEDING THE
ACCIDENT SCENE WAS IRRELEVANT, INCORRECT, CONFUSING, AND
PREJUDICIAL AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED,
As pointed

out

in appellee's

answer

brief, video-taped

evidence is admissible in the state of Utah.

Rule 1001(2) Utah

Rules of Evidence, (1991).

However, the admission of video-taped

evidence is not unlimited.

First, video taped evidence must meet

the foundation requirements for authentication which is required of
all evidence.

In State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985), the

court held that the adequacy of foundation for admissability of
photographs is not undermined by minor discrepancies in testimony,
because these went only to details of time and place and were not
material to the purpose for which the evidence was introduced.
However, in the case at bar the court admitted a video tape
which was filmed from a different height than actually viewed by
the plaintiff, from a different position in the road than that
driven by the plaintiff (the defendant testified that the plaintiff
was closer to the inside of his own lane when the accident occurred
(Deposition Taken of Gary Laney, Dec. 15, 1988, p. 13)), and filmed
at a different speed than that traveled by the plaintiff (contrary
to appellee's implied argument that when two vehicles are traveling
within the speed limit they are therefore traveling at the same
speed).
Purcell,

clearly

allows

photographic

evidence

with

discrepancies as to authentication when those discrepancies do not
undermine the very purpose for which the photographic evidence is
being introduced.

However, in the instant case, the defendant
1

introduced this irrelevant video tape to show the type of curve and
surrounding circumstances as they were at the time of the accident,
and as viewed by the parties.

(Hearing Held Outside the Presence

of the Jury, Dec, 13, 1991, p. 48 1. 20-25).
The defendant
introducing

either

made

it clear what his motives were for

of two video

tapes when he

responded to

plaintiff's argument against admitting such evidence:
[I] agree with Mr. Ivie to the extent that no one can say
what happened other than these two drivers. And Mr.
Butts has testified that he saw Mr. Laney across the
center line. Mr. Laney said "I wasn't across the center
line." And so we have proposed various theories as to
why Mr. Butts may have seen across the center line. We
are not saying that's the only theory, but I think we are
entitled to put on such evidence to say that this is a
possibility for him seeing across the center line. It's
not an attempt to say this is the reconstruction. It's
an attempt to do exactly what we have attempted to do and
say this is one explanation as to why Mr. Butts thought
it [defendant] was across the center line. He can give
all those things in cross examination . . . there was a
telephoto lens used and all of these different things to
persuade the jury that what they are seeing isn't
actually what happened.
Ibid, at p. 43, 1. 13-25; p. 44, 1. 1-4 (Brackets Added)
Upon this video evidence the defense built their seemingly
persuasive

argument

of

an

optical

illusion

theory.

The

discrepancies in the filming of the video materially undermine the
very reason for which they were admitted, and therefore undermine
the adequacy of the foundation for the video tape's admissability.
Rule 902, Utah Rules of evidence (1991).
Contrary to appellee's contention that the video tape shown to
the jury contained the actual point where the accident occurred,
the only section viewed was the preceding roaid.
2

(Hearing Held

Outside the Presence of the Jury, Dec. 13, 1991, p. 49; p. 50, 1.
1-10)•

This is relevant to the issue of whether the admission of

the video tape portraying the preceding road did in fact confuse
the jury, as to what the surrounding circumstances were where the
accident occurred.
Appellee began his argument by discrediting the early, but
landmark case of Ortiz v. State, 30 Fla. 256, 11 So. 611 (Fla.
1892) .

This

case

stands

for

the

standard

that

distorted

photographic evidence which is misleading and which can be of no
assistance to the jury in the case, but stands as an agency of
confusion, should be excluded.
Supreme Court held that

M

In a more recent case the Kansas

[i]t is only when photographs are

distorted, indirect, incorrect, or are otherwise unfair, that they
are objectionable."
557,558

(Kan. 1979).

Ellis v. City Of Kansas City, 589 P.2d 552,
These two cases focus on the possibly

negative effect distorted and incorrect visual images can have on
a jury when the case itself relies heavily on visual perspective.
Appellee, in his answer, cites the distinguishable case of
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980).

Brown, a criminal case,

has as its central focus the criminal offense of first degree
murder.

Neither the prosecution, nor the defense, purported

theories that relied on visual perspective.

The video tape was

illustrative of the area around a trailer and truck where the
victim was chased, repeatedly shot, and buried; this was to show
where the witnesses, victim, and assailant stood. The case at bar
is

inapposite

to Brown, because
3

the

defendant

purported

an

explanation

for why the plaintiff

saw and testified

that he

specifically saw the defendant cross over the center dividing line
into his lane causing him to swerve off the road into some rock
outcroppings resulting in serious injuries to the plaintiff. This
explanation was that at the point where the accident occurred, an
optical illusion was created causing the plaintiff to "see" the
defendant cross over the center line.
Contrary to the illustrative evidence admitted in Brown, the
video tape of the road preceding the accident was used to support
the defendant's theory, directly undermining Mr. Butts strongest
evidence; this theory relied

directly on visual perspective.

Defense counsel proposed their theory of an optical illusion and
also referred to this evidence in closing argument.

(Testimony

Held Outside the Presence of the Jury, February 14, 1991, P. 6; P.
7, L. 1-21).
The defendant's own expert testified of the distortion created
in a video when it is filmed at varying heights and at different
lateral locations.

(Transcript of Trial Held on February 13, 1991,

p. 41, 1. 6-12) „

This distortion may have misled the jury and

confused them concerning the probability of an optical illusion.
Furthermore,

the

trial

court

erred

in

admitting

this

incorrect, and distorted evidence and failing to point out the
discrepancies between the visual perspective of a person driving a
motorcycle, viewing the road from the height of the motorcycle, at
a position in the road where appellant was driving, and at the
speed driven by the appellant, and the visual perspective portrayed
4

in the video• The Idaho Supreme Court held that such discrepancies
need to be pointed out to the jury, if such inaccurate evidence is
to be admitted.

The court stated:

,f

[i]t is established that the

use of exhibits by a testifying witness in order to supplement or
illustrate events is proper insofar as the differences between the
events depicted and the events observed are explained by the
witness and the exhibit is not deceptive." Zolber v. Winters, 712
P. 2d 525 (Idaho 1985).

See also Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co. ,

Inc. 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989).

In the case at bar, there was

no explanation offered by the witness, elicited by counsel, nor
interjected by the court concerning these material discrepancies.
This enabled counsel to support their theory of an optical illusion
and undermine the appellant's case.
The defendant points out that this tape was created by the
plaintiff's own expert reconstructionist.

The inference is that

this video, because it was created by plaintiff's expert, cannot be
confusing, misleading,

and prejudicial

because

the plaintiff

created it for his own benefit at trial. First, the video was not
created for the purpose of giving the jury the correct visual
perspective of the road where the accident occurred, nor to portray
the type of corner where the accident occurred.

It wasn't even

created for use at trial. Rather, it was created by Mr. Duval for
his own use.
Furthermore, defense counsel alludes to plaintiff's expert's
(Mr. Duval) deposition statement that photographic evidence is
helpful to the jury.

(Appellee's Answer Brief, p. 4, paragraph 2).
5

The appellant concedes this fact, but is compelled to add that
misleading, distorted, and confusing photographic evidence can do
more harm than accurate photographic evidence can do good.
Appellee points out that aerial photographs submitted by the
plaintiff were admitted as illustrative and were clearly taken at
different height variations than that experienced by the parties.
However, appellee fails to acknowledge the distinction between the
video tape that incorrectly depicted a visual perspective which can
be construed by the jury as the perspective which the parties
experienced, and the aerial photographs which in no way can be
confused to portray such visual perspective.
Rule 402, of the Utah Rules of Evidence, explicitly precludes
the admission of irrelevant evidence.

Rule 401 defines relevant

evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."

The video tape depicted the preceding road which had

absolutely

no

bearing

on

determination of the action.

any

fact

of

consequence

to

the

The preceding road did not dictate

the visual perspective, elevation, angle or existing light at the
actual corner where the accident took place. It's only effect was
as an agent of confusion.

6

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENSE COUNSEL TO SOLICIT
EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD RECEIVED WORKER1S COMPENSATION
BENEFITS FOR THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION.
In Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 121 (Utah 1965), the Supreme
Court declared that it is the "duty of both counsel and court to
guard against" the introduction of insurance.

The court's use of

the word duty indicates the important and well-accepted task of
precluding this damaging evidence.

In C. R. Owens Trucking Corp.

v, Stewart, 509 P.2d 821, 823 (Utah 1973), the Supreme Court
reemphasized the danger of allowing damaging evidence as to the
existence of insurance when it stated: "Interjection of insurance
into trial should be forestalled by counsel and court wherever and
whenever possible."

The court indicates again that great lengths

should be taken to prevent such damaging evidence from coming
before the jury.

As so eloquently provided by the appellee, the

court went on to qualify their conviction against introduction of
such evidence when they stated: "we could not make it anymore
definite unless we said damn it."
Appellee mentions that the appellant has used cases from
foreign jurisdictions to support the argument that injection of
evidence by the defendant about the plaintiff receiving worker's
compensation benefits is prejudicial, immaterial, and reversible
error. This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah and
although the Supreme Court has dealt with the effect evidence as to
insurance has at trial, the court has not decided on what effect
evidence as to already received worker's compensation benefits has

7

at trial. To resolve this legal issue of first impression, we must
look to sister jurisdictions for assistance.
Appellee concedes the fact that at side bar the defense and
the court were warned that plaintiff's line of questioning would
lead to evidence concerning worker's compensation benefits.

This

objection is preserved in the record later when the jury was
recessed.

Counsel for the plaintiff stated:

The basis for my objection was that there was a
collateral source for this accident. As Mr. Butts was
required to testify, he wasn't working at the time that
claim was made, he suffered a fall that Dr. Gaufin felt
was related directly to the motorcycle accident . . that
it's now in has allowed the jury to know there is a
collateral source, they may therefore feel that Mr. Butts
doesn't require compensation, that he would be given
double compensation for such things as medical bills and
lost wages.
Proceedings Held Outside the Presence of the Jury on February 12,
1991, p. 8, 1. 16-25; p. 9, 1. 1-4).
The

fact

that

there

was

introduction

of this damaging

counsel

the

nor

court

saw

ample

warning

concerning

the

evidence, that neither defense
fit

to

prevent

its

prejudicial

introduction, warrants a new opportunity for the plaintiff to have
his claim determined free from such material prejudice.
Furthermore, appellee points out that common sense dictates
that defense counsel wouldn't want to reveal evidence concerning
subsequent injuries related to the accident in question, but this
ignores the greater benefit to the defense's case of informing the
jury that the plaintiff has already received worker's compensation
benefits for his injuries and is seeking further compensation.

8

The record reflects that defense counsel made absolutely no
attempt to stop this testimony when it was apparent that the
explanation was moving closer and closer and eventually touched on
the benefits received from worker's compensation claims from the
disputed accident. Counsel then d: w attention to this evidence as
to received worker's compensation benefits by requesting the court
to make sure the record reflect that this explanation was a
voluntary

response

questioning.

after

a pause

in the defense's

line of

(Transcript of Cross Examination of Plaintiff,

Douglas E. Butts, p. 16, 1. 8-11).

This is nothing more than the

result of an intentional line of questioning meant to reveal the
evidence as to received worker's compensation benefits from the
1987 Accident. (Ibid, at p. 15, 1. 10-25, p. 16, 1. 1-11)
Appellee cites the case of C.R. Owens Trucking Corp. v.
Stewart, 509 P.2d 821, 823 (Utah 1973), as precedent for the
proposition that the mere mention of insurance does not in all
cases lead to the conclusion that the jury was prejudiced, but if
this excerpt from the case is to be used the case must be looked at
as a whole.

In Stewart, the plaintiff's witness mentioned the

existence of insurance, but the allusions came from completely
unrelated questioning.
asked

"and

did

Compensation?"

you

In the instant case, the plaintiff was
make

a

claim,

an

Industrial

Workman's

(Transcript of Cross Examination of Plaintiff,

Douglas E. Butts, p. 15, 1. 13,14).

Subsequent to a side bar

conference, where plaintiff's counsel and the court were warned
concerning

the

fear

of

revelation
9

of

worker's

compensation

benefits, which would indicate the plaintiff was covered under
worker's compensation when working for Ray Butt's Construction Co. ,
the defendant continued the same line of questioning.
Defense counsel's continued pressing of the question as to
whether plaintiff had made a worker's compensation

claim in

February of 1989, left the plaintiff on the horns of a dilemma. On
the one hand, the plaintiff could not deny having made such a claim
because he was under oath and the fact that he had made such a
claim was the literal truth. However, to let the matter go at that
would create a clear inference that he had returned to work in
February of 1989.

Such an inference would strongly impeach the

truthfulness of his testimony and the testimony of his expert
medical witnesses regarding the severity of his injuries and
ultimately the legitimate value of his claim for damages.
The other horn is that the plaintiff had only one other
possible response to defense counsel's line of questioning, and
that was to qualify his answer by stating, as the plaintiff did,
that the fall precipitating the 1989 medical treatment was a result
of the 1987 motor vehicle accident and subsequent disabilities. As
he was receiving worker's compensation for th€> 1987 incident, he
was entitled to submit a claim for medical treatment for accidents
caused by physical impairments from this incident; the 1989 fall
was such an accident. It is imperative to note that the reasonable
explanation for the 1989 worker's compensation claim was proffered
at side bar outside the hearing of the jury.

(Proceedings Held

Outside the Presence of the Jury on February 12, 1991, p. 8, 1. 1610

25; p. 9, 1. 1-4).

The fact that the plaintiff, Douglas Butts,

could not have returned to work in 1989 due to the severity of his
injuries and gross physical impairment was really beyond question
as

pointed

out

in

appellant's

original

brief.

Appellee's

contention that interjection of the 1989 worker's compensation
claim is legitimate impeachment regarding Mr. Butt's ability to
work becomes ludicrous when compared with the severity of his
injuries and the fact that a reasonable explanation was tendered at
side bar.
Nevertheless, defense counsel, over the objection of the
plaintiff, pressed the issue while the plaintiff was on the stand
under cross examination.

Thus, forcing the plaintiff to choose

what he felt to be the lesser horn of the dilemma posed to him, and
give an honest answer which necessarily interjected the issue of
worker's compensation benefits.
In Stewart, the revelation of such evidence was clearly
unintentional, and the court also instructed the jury to disregard
the statements concerning insurance.

The Supreme Court of Utah

stated in Stewart, that the instruction by the judge to the jury to
disregard the inadvertent mention of insurance was sufficient to
cure the matter.

Ibid, at 823.

In the present case there was no

such instruction by the court, only the blatant admission of
evidence concerning worker's compensation with the qualification
that there was to be no mention of amount.
Whether an amount is mentioned concerning the already received
benefits is immaterial, because the introduction of such benefits
11

only leaves the jury with the task of creatively filling in the
blank•

This blank check standard of determining whether such

evidence is prejudicial, arguably allows in more damaging testimony
with open ended implications than introduction of the limited
amount of benefits that actually are received under worker's
compensation. The standard, as is adopted in many other states, is
strict prohibition of evidence as to received worker's compensation
benefits; this avoids the prejudice.
Interjection

of

worker's

compensation

benefits

is most

prejudicial in cases such as the instant case, where the issue of
liability is hotly disputed.

In this case, the plaintiff claimed

the defendant crossed over the center line forcing the plaintiff
off the road. Such allegations were firmly denied by the defendant
and

the

jury was

circumstantial

left

evidence;

to decide
this

whom

evidence

respective party in its own favor.

to

believe

was

based

raised

by

on

each

In the end, the jury was left

with a difficult decision as to whether the plciintiff had met his
burden of proof in showing the defendant's negligence.

It is

indeed probable that the scales in this case were tipped in favor
of the defendant by the jury's knowledge of the plaintiff already
receiving benefits under worker's compensation.

The jury could

therefore afford to err in favor of the defendant on the difficult
liability issues.
Additionally,

appellee's

contention

that

admission

of

prejudicial evidence is moot because plaintiff's counsel stipulated
to certain medical records which contain references to worker's
12

compensation claims, is in err. Appellant initially concedes that
they stipulated to the admissability of voluminous medical records,
and appellant would not be surprised that such records contained
references to worker's compensation. However, the purpose of this
stipulation was to prevent parties from having to call a multitude
of record keepers to establish foundation to then admit these
records at trial.

Neither plaintiff nor defendant offered any

other records which interjected the issue of worker's compensation.
Had defendant offered any medical records or other documentation
containing references to worker's compensation, plaintiff would
have objected and would have raised the same issue which was raised
at trial and is now raised on appeal regarding the interjection of
worker's compensation benefits.
Furthermore, had such records been offered, the plaintiff
would have had the chance to point out to the trial court that the
stipulation was not intended to allow admission of any record,
regardless of it's otherwise inadmissable content, at the whim of
either party, but that it was merely a stipulation intended to
resolve foundational issues and expedite the trial.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT
INDICATING AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY.
In Reid v. Owens. 93 P.2d 680 (Utah 1939), the Utah Supreme
Court established the rule that evidence as to liability insurance
is admissible when such evidence is intertwined with evidence of an
admission of liability. In this case there was a verbal admission,
however, the court did not define whether such an admission is
13

limited to verbal admissions or whether conduct indicating an
admission of liability may also qualify.
The main concern behind allowing in evidence as to insurance
is that the jury will base their decision on whether there is a
source from which damages may be awarded (a deep pocket), rather
than basing their decision on the evidence before them.
competing,

overriding

interest

expressed

in Re id

The

is that an

admission of liability is vital to the determination of whether the
defendant did in fact cause the accident and admitted to being the
cause through an acceptance of liability.

In the case at bar, the

evidence indicates that the defendant's conduct gives rise to a
question of fact as to whether his actions subsequent to the
accident show that he in fact believed he was responsible for the
at-fault accident in which the plaintiff was seriously injured.
First, the defendant changed his motor vehicle insurance
company in mid-policy three weeks after the accident.

(Testimony

Held Outside the Presence of the Jury, February 14, 1991, P. 2, L.
24, 25; P. 3, L. 1). Appellee argues that this switch was solely
due to the defendant getting a lower premium, however, this motive
becomes very questionable in light of the relevant evidence.
Secondly, to compound the spurious nature of this action, the
defendant sought to conceal his prompt switching, rather than
instead justifying it by claiming a benign motive.

The defendant

misinformed the plaintiff that he had switched his insurance
companies several months after the accident.

This occurred while

being deposed on December 15, 1988, 18 months after the June 17,
14

1987 accident. The defendant testified under oath in the following
manner•
Q: Do you remember how many days after the accident you
dropped Allstate insurance and purchased a policy through
a different company?
A: Sure.

It was several Months.

Deposition of Defendant Gary Laney, taken on Dec. 15, 1988, (p. 26,
1. 12-16).
It is apparent from this testimony that the defendant had no
problem remembering the incorrect time that had elapsed, and when
giv£n further opportunity to recant or correct his testimony he
reconfirmed the incorrect answer. (Ibid, at p. 26, 1. 18, 19).
Froia the

defendant's

testimony,

it: appears

that

he

had no

difficulty remembering exactly how long it \*as between the accident
and his mid-policy switching of insurance companies. During Cross
examination, the defendant recanted and stated that he in fact had
switched insurance companies only three weeks after the accident.
(Hearing held Outside the Presence of the Jury, Feb. 14, 1991, p.
4, 1. 23-25; p. 5, 1. 1-15).
Further, during cross examination the defendant testified that
he ^witched insurance companies to get a lower premium.

It was

pointed out at trial that although the defendant did get a lower
premium, that this was only due to incorrect information given to
the new insurance company, and had he given correct information
concerning prior accidents or moving violations, he would have
received no such decrease in premiums.
1-5/ p. 27; p. 28, 1. 1-11).

15

(Ibid, at p. 24; p. 25, 1.

Dale Knapp, the Allstate insurance agent who sold their policy
and

was

policies,

experienced

with

the

State

Farm

testified

that

the

standard

and

other

facility

competing

policy

(that

company's policy which was comparable to the policy sold by State
Farm to the defendant) was competitive and in fact lower than the
State Farm policy acquired in December of 1988 by the defendant.
(Ibid at, p. 18, 1. 21-25; p. 19, 1. 1)
Furthermore, the defendant had received a reevaluation from
Allstate and had, as testified to by Mr. Knapp, not been allowed to
move to the standard policy, but due to his driving record remained
in the higher risk policy.

(Ibid at, p. 23, 1. 4-11; p. 24, 1. 17-

25; p. 25; p. 27, 1. 20-25; p. 28).
records

showing

available

to

a

prior

at-fault

Utah

insurance

It was also revealed that

accidents
company

would
who

not

then

have

insured

been
the

defendant, and the evidence appears to confirm, that this was not
discovered by State Farm.
Further
indicates

supporting

his belief

(Ibid at, pp. 29, 30).
evidence

that

the

defendant's

that he was responsible

for an

conduct
at-fault

accident, is his calling the hospital the day after the accident to
"see

if

he

[plaintiff]

was

there

and

how

he

was

doing."

(Deposition of Gary Laney, Defendant, Dec. 15, 1988, p. 25, 1. 1719).
Taken in the aggregate, the defendant's actions in switching
liability

insurance

in

mid-policy

and

three

weeks

after

the

accident, and not only denying it under oath, but also grossly
exaggerating the time frame, raise a clear inference of his belief
16

or awareness of his culpability for the motor vehicle accident.
Appellee1s continued assertion that his conduct is explained simply
because he received a better premium is inadequate in light of the
fact that he went from a high risk coverage to a low risk coverage.
The very fact that he did achieve a better underwriter status is
further evidence that the policy change was made knowing that he
was culpable in a serious motor vehicle accident, and that once the
facts came to light he would no longer be eligible for his desired
lower risk category of insurance, and would probably be canceled
altogether.
This case is deficient any witnesses to either confirm or deny
the contradictory testimony of the parties, and there was not
enough evidence from reconstructionists to verify either parties'
contentions. Under these circumstances it is crucial that evidence
concerning conduct of the defendant which indicates his belief that
he was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, be admitted.
The probative value of this evidence, creating a strong
question of fact for the jury to decide, outweighs the possible
prejudice to the defendant.

This is not an immaterial fact used

merely to bring in evidence as to a collateral source, but a
material fact which goes directly to prove the cause of action.
Not withstanding
the general rule against the
introduction of evidence suggesting or implying that the
defendant is protected by liability insurance, the
suggestion of the possession of insurance will not be
avoided at the cost of suppressing evidence material to
the establishment of a cause of action and the liability
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of a defendant sued for damages, or to show bias or
prejudice of a witness.
Annat., Admissabilitv of evidence, and propriety and effect of
questions, comments, etc. tending to show that defendant in
personal injury or death action carries liability insurance, 4
A.L.R. 2d 761 (1949) (Emphasis added).

CONCLUSION
Appellant was prejudiced both as to liability and damages by
the admission of distorted and misleading video-taped evidence; by
allowing defense counsel to pursue a damaging line of questioning
which led to the introduction of evidence of the plaintiff's
receipt of worker's compensation benefits, when defense counsel and
the court were forewarned of the probable testimony and likely
prejudice that would, and in fact did, result; and by disallowing
•the plaintiff the opportunity to put evidence before the jury
concerning

the

defendant's

culpable

conduct

indicating

his

acknowledgement of liability for the serious injuries to the
plaintiff. For the above reasons, severally and cumulatively, the
appellant was prejudiced, the trial court erred, and a new trial
should be granted.
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Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence/9
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to ™nlrp the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — Thii rale la
the federal rale, verbatim, and ii comparable
in substance to Role 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rale defined relevant evidence aa that having a tendency to

prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact," Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the fppifrati'?'" given to
fanner Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of remoteness.
Cited.
Effect of remoteness*
Remoteneea usually goat to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zioni Coop. Mercantile Inst, 606 ?M 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds,
McFariand v. Skaggs Companies, Inc^ 678
PJ2d 298 (Utah 1984).

Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Nicklee, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah
1986>, Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp^ 747
P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct App, 1988); Fisher ex reL
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct App.
1988): Belden v. Oalbo, In*, 752 P.2d 1317
(Utah Ct App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 766
?M 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, HO
PJ2d981 (Utah 1989); State, In re RJ) A , 777
P.2d 532 (Utah C t App. 1989); Whitehead v.
American Motors Sales Corp^ 801 P.2d 920
(Utah 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78.
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific

Evidence and the Rejection of Fire, 1986 Utah
Lfiev. 839.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
thia role u Rale 402, Uniform Rules of Evideuce (1974) except that prior to the word
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United
States" have been added.

Compiler's Notes. — 11M Utah rule alio
add* the words "or the Constitution of the state
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi^
(1974)

Rule 902. Self-authentication.

isSf^ui^
* i i ) D°UStic.v^al
1 ° ^ ^ a m i e r ^ ^ A document bearing a
seal purportingtobe that of the United States, or
tfM?S£Efct.
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession t w J u T \ 1 A ! P I ™ O
Ca^ai Zone, or . h ^ Territory of
ffi"Kc&£
J ? ,
$ S
porting to be an attestation or execution.
^ ^
« ; Domestic puttie documents not nnw^o^i A J
portingtob«r tkTSgnatnr. in h u f o n S ^ S T t f t . ' ^ ^ Z '
ployee of any entity included in Paraeranhnn™-! 7 ™ ^ ^ *T ? '
P«bUc officer K g . ^
S i S S S ^ O ^ S ^ S ^ A / l

foreign official whose certificate o f r e n n i n e ^ S K ^ L ? ®i £ • ? *

Action or K ^ K E
without final certification.

^ ;
UBUKWI

. ^ ? * " * - « *
°J ™ attested summary with or

r ^ n a « t h o r i z e d t o n S S e ^ e S f £ d d c ^ 5 ^ «Btodian or other

new^ap^or^c1r

i 0 d l C

^ ^ ^ ' ^ t ^ P-porting to be
m

ing o ^ n ^ ^ ^ o r S ^

^ « ™ * business « * indicat-

- ^ a S S g n ^ ^ ^ ^ L ^ a c ^ p a j i e d ^ a certifi.
notary public or ^SStSSSS^S^LT'T.
^ ^ * Uw *a
(9) C o n i m e r r i a l n a w ^ f d ™ f ^ ^ b y , U > t t e acknowledgments.
signatures t h ^ , P a K S u l f S f ^ documents. Commercial paper,
vided by general
commercial law
^ ^ thereto to the extent protne constitution of this state.
^ " S S S t o S S l S l * u J L ' tIaS
^
Evidence (1971)
^ - rf

"

"" °" I"""*^ i=

R?'rfbd !^r ( 1 0 ) fa
Balm

^ ^ *»*«». U«ifcm
Erohnw (1974).
^ ^

ARTICLE X.
CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS,
AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
Rule 1001. Definitions.
For Purposes 8of thisd article
the following definitions are applicable:
I « £ L S 2 " r™ TOTdhlg
^ " W r i ^ ^ and "recordu^" consist of
S S S r i S ? " ° T*"? ° r t h d r e « o i ' » t a * • * downbytuindwriting,
^pewnting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse
mechanical or electrenic recording, or other
fornfof^£^S
aphS
fik?, ^ ! ? f
- J^F*^"
delude -ill photographsP X ra*
y
films, video tapes, and motion pictures.
j S L S f 1 ^ *" "^S^" o f a *»**»* °rrecordingis the writing or
recording itself or any counterpart intended to havelhe same effect by a
person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the
negatave or any print therefrom. If data are stored i n a computern
the
7 P n
Jreuect
^ I S tne
T X data
. " * accurately,
^ U t ?is °an
Joriginal"
° U t p U t r e a d a b l efay* t , shown to
(4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same
P y mcludm

'
S enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical
« L n r £ ° r » « » * » « » o r by f i n i c a l reproduction, or by other equivalent techmques which accurately reproduce the original.
JOST

* ^ S r 2 £ ^ 3 ^ *
writing" in subdivision (1) comsponda in sub-

^^^"^UUhRule-ofEvidence

